On the observational equivalence of continuous-time deterministic and indeterministic descriptions by Werndl, Charlotte
  
Charlotte Werndl 
 
On the observational equivalence of 
continuous-time deterministic and 
indeterministic descriptions 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Werndl, Charlotte (2011) On the observational equivalence of continuous-time deterministic and 
indeterministic descriptions. European journal for philosophy of science, 1 (2). pp. 193-225. 
ISSN 1879-4912  
DOI: 10.1007/s13194-010-0011-5/  
 
© 2011 Springer Science+Business Media B.V 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/31093/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: July 2013 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
On the Observational Equivalence of Continuous-Time
Deterministic and Indeterministic Descriptions
Charlotte Werndl; c.s.werndl@lse.ac.uk
Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, London School of Economics
Abstract. This paper presents and philosophically assesses three types of results on the
observational equivalence of continuous-time measure-theoretic deterministic and indeter-
ministic descriptions. The first results establish observational equivalence to abstract
mathematical descriptions. The second results are stronger because they show observa-
tional equivalence between deterministic and indeterministic descriptions found in science.
Here I also discuss Kolmogorov’s contribution. For the third results I introduce two new
meanings of ‘observational equivalence at every observation level’. Then I show the even
stronger result of observational equivalence at every (and not just some) observation level
between deterministic and indeterministic descriptions found in science. These results im-
ply the following. Suppose one wants to find out whether a phenomenon is best modeled as
deterministic or indeterministic. Then one cannot appeal to differences in the probability
distributions of deterministic and indeterministic descriptions found in science to argue
that one of the descriptions is preferable because there is no such difference. Finally, I crit-
icise the extant claims of philosophers and mathematicians on observational equivalence.
This article has been published in the European Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1
(2), pp. 193–225. The final publication is available at:
http://www.springerlink.com/content/a150675122r42646/
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2
1 Introduction
Determinism and indeterminism and whether one can know that phenomena are governed
by deterministic or indeterministic laws are crucial philosophical themes. Hence it is an
important question whether there is observational equivalence between deterministic and
indeterministic descriptions. However, this question has hardly been discussed. This pa-
per contributes to filling this gap by presenting and philosophically assessing three types of
results of increasing strength on the observational equivalence of deterministic and indeter-
ministic descriptions. When saying that a deterministic and an indeterministic description
are observationally equivalent, I mean that the deterministic description, when observed,
gives the same predictions as the indeterministic description. The deterministic and in-
deterministic descriptions of concern are continuous-time measure-theoretic deterministic
systems and stochastic processes.
More specifically, the first results are about observational equivalence to abstract math-
ematical descriptions. I present a method of constructing, given a deterministic system,
an observationally equivalent stochastic process, and conversely. Compared to the first re-
sults, the second results are stronger because they show not only observational equivalence
to abstract mathematical descriptions but observational equivalence between deterministic
and stochastic descriptions of the types antecedently found in science. Compared to the
second results, the third results are even stronger because they show that there is obser-
vational equivalence at every (not just at some) observation level between deterministic
and stochastic descriptions found in science. Notice that the increase in strength is very
different for the move from the first to the second results (observational equivalence be-
tween descriptions found in science and not just to abstract mathematical descriptions)
and for the move from the second to the third results (observational equivalence between
descriptions in science at every, and not just at some, observation level).
I argue that a philosophical consequence of these results is the following. Suppose one
wants to find out whether a phenomenon is best modeled as deterministic or stochastic.
Then one might think of arguing that there is evidence for a deterministic or stochastic
description by appealing to a general difference between the probability distributions of
stochastic processes found in science and the probability distributions of (possibly fine-
enough) observations of deterministic systems found in science. The second and third
results of this paper show that these arguments are untenable because there is no such
general difference between the respective probability distributions.
Finally, I criticise the previous philosophical discussion. The main philosophy literature
on this topic is Suppes and de Barros (1996), Suppes (1999) and Winnie (1998). They claim
that the significance of the third results is to provide a choice between deterministic and
stochastic descriptions. I argue that while there is indeed such a choice, this is already
shown by more basic results, and the third results show something stronger. Also, I criticise
the claims of the mathematicians Ornstein and Weiss (1991) on observational equivalence.
As mentioned above, this paper is about continuous-time measure-theoretic determin-
istic systems and stochastic processes (here the time parameter varies continually). There
are also discrete-time measure-theoretic deterministic systems and stochastic processes
(here the time parameter varies in discrete steps). Werndl (2009a) discusses results about
discrete-time descriptions which answer the question (for discrete time) of whether deter-
ministic and indeterministic descriptions can be observationally equivalent. One of the
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contributions of my paper is to answer this question for continuous-time deterministic sys-
tems and stochastic processes. This is important because, first, the discrete-time results
leave open the answers for continuous time, and the answers for continuous time do not
follow automatically from the discrete-time results. Indeed, as I will explain, the results
differ for continuous-time and discrete-time descriptions; also, the proofs for continuous-
time descriptions are harder and involve different techniques. Second, continuous-time
descriptions are more widespread in science than discrete-time descriptions. Hence the
issue of observational equivalence is more pressing for continuous-time descriptions.
Furthermore, there are several novel contributions of this paper which are not discussed
in Werndl (2009a) or the other extant literature. In particular, I show that there are results
on observational equivalence which increase in strength in a certain sense (namely, the focus
on descriptions found in science and on every observation level). For this I introduce two
new notions of observational equivalence at every observation level, I derive results for these
notions, and I discuss Kolmogorov’s contribution to observational equivalence. Moreover,
I assess the significance of these results and point at their philosophical consequences.
Also, the focus on continuous-time enables me to criticise the philosophical reflections of
mathematicians, namely Ornstein and Weiss (1991). And I criticise in detail the claims of
philosophers such as Suppes and de Barros (1996), Suppes (1999) and Winnie (1998) on
observational equivalence.
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 I introduce continuous-time measure-
theoretic deterministic descriptions and stochastic processes. In Section 3 I present and
assess the first results, in Section 4 the second results, and in Section 5 the third results
on observational equivalence. Finally, in Section 6 I criticise the previous philosophical
discussion on observational equivalence by philosophers and mathematicians.
2 Continuous-Time Deterministic Systems and Stochas-
tic Processes
For what follows, I need to introduce a few basic measure-theoretic notions. Intuitively
speaking, a probability space (M,ΣM , µ) consists of a set M , a set ΣM of subsets of M to
which a probability is assigned, called a sigma-algebra of M , and a probability measure µ
which assigns a probability to subsets of M . Formally, (M,ΣM , µ) is a probability space if,
and only if (iff), M is a set; ΣM is a sigma-algebra of M , i.e., a set of subsets of M with (i)
∅ ∈ ΣM , (ii) for all A ∈ ΣM , M \A ∈ ΣM , and (iii) for any An ∈ ΣM , n ≥ 1,
⋃
nAn ∈ ΣM ;
and µ is a probability measure, i.e., a function µ : ΣM → [0, 1] with (i) µ(A) ≥ 0 for all A ∈
ΣM , (ii) µ(∅) = 0 and µ(M) = 1, and (iii)
∑
n≥1 µ(An) = µ(
⋃
n≥1An) for any An ∈ ΣM .
A pair (M,ΣM) where ΣM is a sigma-algebra of M is called a measurable space. Finally,
mathematically treatable functions in measure theory are called measurable functions; the
functions encountered in science are all measurable. Technically, a function T : M → N ,
where (M,ΣM) and (N,ΣN) are measurable spaces, is measurable iff T
−1(A) ∈ ΣM for all
A ∈ ΣN .1
1For more details on measure theory, see Cornfeld et al. (1982), Doob (1953) and Petersen (1983).
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2.1 Deterministic Systems
This paper is about continuous-time measure-theoretic deterministic systems, in short
deterministic systems, which are widespread in science. The three main elements of a
deterministic system are the phase space, i.e., a set M of all possible states, a probabil-
ity measure µ which assigns a probability to regions of phase space2, and the evolution
functions, i.e., a family of functions Tt : M → M where Tt(m) represents the state of the
system after t time units that started in initial state m. Formally:
Definition 1 A deterministic system is a quadruple (M,ΣM , µ, Tt) where (M,ΣM , µ) is
a probability space (M is the phase space) and Tt : M → M (the evolution functions),
t ∈ R, are measurable functions such that Tt1+t2(m) = Tt2(Tt1(m)) for all m ∈ M and all
t1, t2 ∈ R, and T (t,m) := Tt(m) is measurable in (t,m).
A solution is a possible path of the deterministic system. Formally, the solution through
m, m ∈ M , is the function sm : R → M, sm(t) = T (t,m). All deterministic systems are
deterministic according to the canonical definition: any solutions that agree at one instant
of time agree at all times (Butterfield 2005).
I will often deal with measure-preserving deterministic systems where, intuitively speak-
ing, the probability of any region remains the same when the region is evolved.
Definition 2 A measure-preserving deterministic system is a deterministic system
(M,ΣM , µ, Tt) where µ is invariant, i.e., µ(Tt(A)) = µ(A) for all A ∈ ΣM and t ∈ R.
Measure-preserving deterministic systems are important in all the sciences, especially
in physics (cf. Eckmann and Ruelle 1985). All deterministic Hamiltonian systems and
deterministic systems in statistical mechanics are measure-preserving, and their invariant
probability measure is the normalised Lebesgue measure or a similar measure (Cornfeld
et al. 1982, 4–10). A measure-preserving deterministic system is volume-preserving iff the
normalised Lebesgue measure – the standard measure of the volume – is the invariant
probability measure. A measure-preserving system which fails to be volume-preserving
is dissipative. Dissipative systems can also often be modeled as measure-preserving sys-
tems, e.g., the Lorenz system, which was introduced by Lorenz (1963) to model weather
phenomena (cf. Luzatto et al. 2005).
When observing a deterministic system (M,ΣM , µ, Tt), one observes a value Φ(m) de-
pendent on the actual state m. Thus, technically, observations are observation functions,
i.e., measurable functions Φ : M → MO where (MO,ΣMO) is a measurable space (cf. Orn-
stein and Weiss 1991, 16). An observation function Φ is finite-valued iff it takes only finitely
many values {o1, . . . , ok}, k ∈ N, and every oi can be “seen”, i.e., µ({m ∈ M |Φ(m) =
oi}) > 0 for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k. A finite-valued observation function is nontrivial iff k ≥ 2.
In practice observations are finite-valued.
The following deterministic system will accompany us.
Example 1: A billiard system with convex obstacles.
A billiard system with convex obstacles is a system where a ball moves with constant
2The question of how to interpret this probability is not one of the main topics here. I just mention
a popular interpretation. According to the time-average interpretation, the probability of a set A is
the long-run fraction of the proportion of time the system spends in A (cf. Eckmann and Ruelle 1985;
Werndl 2009b).
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Figure 1: A billiard system with a convex obstacle; (a) a specific state of the billiard (b)
the mathematical representation of the billiard
speed on a rectangular table where there are a finite number of convex obstacles with
a smooth boundary. It is assumed that there is no friction and that there are perfectly
elastic collisions (cf. Ornstein and Galavotti 1974). Figure 1(a) shows a specific state of
the billiard system, where the dashed line indicates the path the ball will take. Figure 1(b)
shows the mathematical representation of the system. M is the set of all possible positions
and directions of the ball. Hence the state of the billiard shown in Figure 1(a) corresponds
to exactly one point m ∈ M shown in Figure 1(b). The normalised Lebesgue measure µ
assigns the probability µ(A) to the event that the billiard is in one of the states represented
by A for any region A in ΣM (intuitively speaking, ΣM is the set of all regions; formally, ΣM
is the Lebesgue σ-algebra). Tt(m), where m = (q, p), gives the position and the direction
after t time units of the ball that starts out in initial position q and initial direction p. And
a solution is a possible path of the billiard over time.
2.2 Stochastic Processes
The indeterministic descriptions of concern in this paper are continuous-time stochastic
processes, in short stochastic processes. Stochastic processes are governed by probabilistic
laws. They are the main indeterministic descriptions used in science.
A random variable Z gives the outcome of a probabilistic experiment, where the dis-
tribution P{Z ∈ A} tells one the probability that the outcome will be in A. Formally, a
random variable is a measurable function Z : Ω → M¯ from a probability space (Ω,ΣΩ, ν)
to a measurable space (M¯,ΣM¯). P{Z ∈ A} = ν(Z−1(A)) for all A ∈ ΣM¯ is the distribution
of Z.
A stochastic process {Zt; t ∈ R} consists of a probabilistic experiment (i.e., a random
variable) for each time t. So Zt(ω) gives the outcome of the process at time t (where ω
represents a possible history in all its details). Formally:
Definition 3 A stochastic process {Zt; t ∈ R} is a family of random variables Zt, t ∈ R,
which are defined on the same probability space (Ω,ΣΩ, ν) and take values in the same
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Figure 2: A realisation of a semi-Markov process
measurable space (M¯,ΣM¯) such that Z(t, ω) = Zt(ω) is jointly measurable in (t, ω).
M¯ is the set of possible outcomes of the process, called the outcome space. A realisation is a
possible path of the stochastic process. Formally, it is function rω : R→ M¯ , rω(t) = Z(t, ω),
for ω ∈ Ω arbitrary (cf. Doob 1953, 4–46).
I will often deal with stationary processes, the probability distributions of which do not
change with time. {Zt; t ∈ R} is stationary iff the distribution of (Zt1+h, . . . , Ztn+h) is the
same as the one of (Zt1 , . . . , Ztn) for all t1, . . . , tn ∈ R, n ∈ N and h ∈ R.
When observing a stochastic process at time t, one observes a value Γ(Zt) dependent
on the outcome Zt. Hence, technically, observations are modeled by observation functions,
i.e., measurable functions Γ : M¯ → M¯O, where (M¯O,ΣM¯O) is a measurable space. Clearly,
observing the stochastic process {Zt; t ∈ R} with Γ yields the process {Γ(Zt); t ∈ R}.
The following stochastic processes will accompany us.
Example 2: Semi-Markov processes.
A semi-Markov process has finitely many possible outcomes si; it takes the outcome si for
a time u(si), and which outcome follows si depends only on si and no other past outcomes.
Figure 2 shows a possible realisation of a semi-Markov process. For a formal definition,
see Subsection 8.1. Semi-Markov processes are widespread in the sciences, from physics
and biology to the social sciences. They are particularly important in queueing theory
(cf. Janssen and Limnios 1999).
Example 3: n-step semi-Markov processes.
n-step semi-Markov processes generalise semi-Markov processes. An n-step semi-Markov
process, n ∈ N, has finitely many possible outcomes si; it takes the outcome si for a time
u(si), and which outcome follows si depends only on the past n outcomes (hence semi-
Markov processes are 1-step semi-Markov processes). For a formal definition, see Subsec-
tion 8.1. Again, n-step semi-Markov processes are widespread in science (cf. Janssen and
Limnios 1999).
A final comment: the descriptions introduced in this section are classical. What results
hold for quantum-mechanical descriptions and how similarities and differences in the results
bear on the relation between classical and quantum mechanics are interesting questions;
but they are beyond the scope of this paper.
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Figure 3: The billiard observed with Φ is observationally equivalent to {Φ(Tt); t ∈ R}.
3 Observational Equivalence: Results I
This section is about observational equivalence to mathematical descriptions. I show how,
when starting with deterministic systems, one finds observationally equivalent stochastic
processes (Subsection 3.1), and how, when starting with stochastic processes, one finds
observationally equivalent deterministic systems (Subsection 3.2).
I speak of observational equivalence if the deterministic system, when observed, and the
stochastic process give the same predictions. More specifically, deterministic systems are
endowed with a probability measure. Hence when observing a deterministic system, the
resulting predictions are the probability distributions over sequences of possible observa-
tions. The predictions obtained from a stochastic process are the probability distributions
over the realisations. Consequently, a deterministic system, when observed, and a stochas-
tic process give the same predictions iff (i) the possible outcomes of the process and the
possible observed values of the system coincide, and (ii) the realisations of the process
and the solutions of the system coarse-grained by the observation function have the same
probability distribution.
3.1 Starting With Deterministic Systems
Assume (M,ΣM , µ, Tt) is observed with Φ : M →MO. Then {Φ(Tt); t ∈ R} is a stochastic
process, which arises by applying Φ to the deterministic system. Thus the possible out-
comes of the process and the possible observed values of the deterministic system coincide,
and the probability distributions over the realisations of the process and over the solu-
tions of the system coarse-grained by the observation function are the same. Therefore,
(M,ΣM , µ, Tt) observed with Φ is observationally equivalent to {Φ(Tt); t ∈ R}.
Let me illustrate this with the billiard system with convex obstacles. Figure 3 shows the
phase space M of the billiard system (cf. Figure 1(b)) and an observation function Φ with
values o1, o2, o3, o4: for all states m in the top left box the observed value is o1, etc. Because
a probability measure µ is defined on M , one obtains probabilities such as P{Φ(Tt) = o2}
and P{Φ(Tt+k) = o4 given that Φ(Tt) = o3}. {Φ(Tt); t ∈ R} has the outcomes o1, o2, o3, o4
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and its probability distributions are obtained by observing the billiard system with Φ.
Thus the billiard system observed with Φ is observationally equivalent to {Φ(Tt); t ∈ R}.
However, we want to know whether {Φ(Tt); t ∈ R} is nontrivial. For let Φ(m) = m
be the identity function. {Φ(Tt(m)); t ∈ R} = {Tt(m); t ∈ R} is formally a stochastic
process which is observationally equivalent to the deterministic system. Yet it is just
the original deterministic system. This result is the formalisation of the old idea that a
deterministic system is the special case of a stochastic process where all probabilities are 0
or 1 (cf. Butterfield 2005). It illustrates that if one wants to arrive at nontrivial stochastic
processes, one has to apply observation functions which are many-to-one.
Yet {Φ(Tt); t ∈ R} is often nontrivial. Several results show this. To my knowledge, the
following theorem has never been discussed before. This theorem characterises a class of
deterministic systems as systems where, regardless which finite-valued observation function
Φ is applied, {Φ(Tt); t ∈ R} is nontrivial in the following sense: for any k ∈ R+ there are
outcomes oi, oj ∈ MO such that the probability of moving in k time steps from oi to oj is
between 0 and 1. This result is strong because there are nontrivial probability distributions
for any finite-valued observation function and all time steps.
Theorem 1 Iff for a measure-preserving deterministic system (M,ΣM , µ, Tt) there does
not exist a n ∈ R+ and a C ∈ ΣM , 0 < µ(C) < 1, such that, except for a set of measure
zero3, Tn(C) = C, then the following holds: for every nontrivial finite-valued observation
function Φ : M → MO, every k ∈ R+ and {Zt; t ∈ R} := {Φ(Tt); t ∈ R} there are
oi, oj ∈MO with 0 < P{Zt+k=oj |Zt=oi} < 1.
For a proof, see Subsection 8.2.4
The assumption of Theorem 1 is equivalent to weak mixing (Hopf 1932). This indicates
a difference between the results for discrete and continuous time. As shown in Werndl
(2009a), for discrete time the condition needed to arrive at the results that, regardless
which finite-valued observation function and time step is considered, one always obtains
nontrivial probability distributions is weaker than weak mixing. In particular, Werndl
(2009a, Section 4.2.2) shows that this result holds even for a class of stable deterministic
systems (i.e., where solutions which start closely stay close all the time). This is not
the case for continuous time because if a deterministic system is weak mixing, there is a
sense in which solutions which start closely eventually separate (cf. Werndl 2009a). Yet
Theorem 1 is just one of the possible theorems one can prove. Dependent on one’s purpose,
one can weaken (or strengthen) the conditions to prove weaker (or stronger5) results on
observational equivalence. And weaker results than Theorem 1 show that one obtains
observational equivalence to nontrivial stochastic processes also for stable deterministic
systems and thus also for non-chaotic systems (chaotic systems show deterministic yet
unstable behaviour). For instance, consider the deterministic system of a rotation on a
circle, which is stable and non-chaotic; M = [0, 1) represents the circle of unit radius, ΣM
is the Lebesgue σ-algebra, µ the Lebesgue measure and Tt(m) = αtm (mod 1), α ∈ R. It
3That is, except for Q with µ(Q) = 0.
4If (M,ΣM , µ, Tt) is measure-preserving, {Φ(Tt); t ∈ R} is stationary (the proof in Werndl 2009a, Sec-
tion 3.3, carries over to continuous time).
5For instance, a stronger result is that for Kolmogorov systems and any finite-valued observation func-
tion the following holds: even if you know the entire infinite history of the process, you will not be able to
predict with certainty which outcome follows next (Uffink 2006, 1012–1014).
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is not hard to see that for any finite-valued observation function Φ the stochastic process
{Zt; t ∈ R} = {Φ(Tt); t ∈ R} is nontrivial in the sense that for almost all (but not
all) time steps there are nontrivial probability distributions. Technically: for any finite-
valued Φ and all, except for a set of measure zero, k ∈ R+, there are oi, oj ∈ MO with
0 < P{Zt+k=oj |Zt=oi} < 1, where {Zt} = {Φ(Tt); t ∈ R}.
Measure-preserving systems are typically weakly mixing (Halmos 1944, 1949). Con-
sequently, Theorem 1 typically applies to measure-preserving deterministic systems. Yet
this does not tell us whether Theorem 1 applies to the deterministic systems of physical
relevance; systems of physical relevance are only a small class of all measure-preserving
systems. But Theorem 1 applies to several physically relevant deterministic systems. It
applies to systems in Newtonian mechanics: for instance, first, to billiard systems with
convex obstacles (Example 1) (Ornstein and Galavotti 1974); second, to many hard-ball
systems, which describe the motion of a number of hard balls undergoing elastic reflec-
tions at the boundary and collisions amongst each other and are important in statistical
mechanics because they model gases; e.g., to two hard balls in a box and the motion of N
hard balls on a torus for almost all values (m1, . . . ,mN , r), where mi is the mass of the i-th
ball and r is the radius of the balls, N ≥ 2 (Berkovitz et al. 2006, 679–680; Sima´nyi 2003);
third, to geodesic flows of negative curvature, i.e., frictionless motion of a particle moving
with unit speed on a compact manifold with everywhere negative curvature (Ornstein and
Weiss 1991, Section 4). Also, Theorem 1 applies to dissipative systems, such as Lorenz-
type systems, which model weather dynamics and waterwheels (Lorenz 1963; Luzzatto
et al. 2005; Strogatz 1994). Because proofs are extremely hard, it is often only conjec-
tured that deterministic systems satisfy Theorem 1, e.g., for any number of hard balls in
a box (Berkovitz et al. 2006, 679–680). Note that the deterministic systems listed in this
paragraph are chaotic.
There are also many systems to which Theorem 1 does not apply. For instance, ac-
cording to the KAM theorem, the phase space of integrable Hamiltonian systems which
are perturbed by a small non-integrable perturbation breaks up into stable regions and
regions with unstable behavior. Because of the break up into regions, Theorem 1 does not
apply to these systems (cf. Berkovitz et al. 2006, Section 4). But even if Theorem 1 does
not apply to the whole deterministic system, it might well apply to the motion restricted
to some regions A of phase space (and this is conjectured for KAM-type systems). Then
it follows from Theorem 1 that all finite-valued observations which discriminate between
values in A lead to nontrivial stochastic processes.
3.2 Starting With Stochastic Processes
The following idea of how, given stochastic processes, one finds observationally equivalent
deterministic systems will be needed for what follows. It is well known in mathematics and
in philosophy of physics (Butterfield 2005; Doob 1953, 6–7; for discrete time it is discussed
in Werndl 2009a, Section 3.2).
The underlying idea is that one constructs a deterministic system whose phase space is
the set of all possible realisations m(τ), whose evolution functions Tt shift the realisation t
time steps to the left, and whose observation function Φ0 gives the value of the realisation
at time 0. Because Tt shifts the realisation m(τ) t time steps to the left, observing Tt(m(τ))
with Φ0 gives the value of the realisation m(τ) at time t. Hence successive observations
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return the values of the realisation m(τ) at different times and so simply yield the outcomes
of the stochastic process.
Formally, for {Zt; t ∈ R} with outcome space M¯ , let M be the set of all possible
realisations, i.e., functions m(τ) from R to M¯ . Let ΣM be the σ-algebra generated6 by the
cylinder-sets
CA1...Ani1...in ={m∈M |m(i1)∈A1, ...,m(in)∈An, Aj∈ΣM¯ , ij∈R, i1< ... <in, 1≤ j≤ n}. (1)
Let µ be the measure on M determined by the probability distributions of {Zt; t ∈ R}.
That is, µ is the unique probability measure arising by assigning to each CA1...Ani1...in the
probability P{Zi1 ∈ A1, . . . , Zin ∈ An}. The evolution functions shift a realisation t
times to the left, i.e., Tt(m(τ)) = m(τ + t). (M,ΣM , µ, Tt) is a deterministic system
called the deterministic representation of {Zt; t ∈ R} (cf. Doob 1953, 621–622). Finally,
assume that the observation function gives the value of the realisation at time zero, i.e.,
Φ0(m(τ)) = m(0).
Because one only observes the 0-th coordinate, the possible outcomes of a stochastic
process and the possible observed values of its deterministic representation coincide. More-
over, because µ is defined by the stochastic process, the probability distribution over the
realisations is the same as the one over the sequences of observed values of its deterministic
representation. Therefore, a stochastic process is observationally equivalent to its determin-
istic representation observed with Φ0. Consequently, for every process there is at least one
observationally equivalent deterministic system.7 For instance, consider a semi-Markov
process {Zt; t ∈ R} (Example 2) and its deterministic representation (M,ΣM , µ, Tt). Here
M is the set of all possible realisations of the semi-Markov process, µ gives the probability
distribution over the realisations, Tt shifts a realisation t time steps to the left, and Φ0
returns the value of the realisation at time 0.
Philosophically speaking, the deterministic representation is a cheat. For it resembles
the following argument: Fred was fatally wounded at noon; therefore he died later. The
predicate ‘being fatally wounded a noon’ implies that Fred will die later. Hence the ar-
gument is trivially valid. Similarly, the states of the deterministic representation are con-
structed such that they encode the future and past evolution of the process. So there is
the question whether deterministic systems which do not involve a cheat can be observa-
tionally equivalent to a given stochastic process. It will become clear later that for some
stochastic processes the answer is positive. It is unknown whether the answer is positive
for every stochastic process. For a formalisation of the notion of observational equivalence
underlying Section 3, see Werndl 2009a (the definition carries over to continuous-time).
4 Observational Equivalence: Results II
The previous section only showed that in certain cases there is observational equivalence to
abstract mathematical descriptions. Furthermore, the deterministic representation – one of
these abstract mathematical descriptions – is not used by scientists. This raises the ques-
tion of whether there can be observational equivalence not only to abstract mathematical
6The σ-algebra generated by E is the smallest σ-algebra containing E; that is, the σ-algebra⋂
σ-algebras Σ, E⊆Σ Σ.
7The deterministic representation of any stationary process is measure-preserving (the proof in
Werndl 2009a, Section 3.3, carries over to continuous time).
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descriptions but whether a stronger result can hold: namely, that there is observational
equivalence between stochastic processes and deterministic systems of the types used in
scientific theorising (in short, systems and processes in science).
If the answer is negative, one could divide the probability distributions found in science
into two groups: the ones deriving from observations of deterministic systems in science,
and the ones deriving from stochastic processes in science and their observations.8 Sup-
pose one wants to find out whether a phenomenon is best described as deterministic or
stochastic. Then one might argue the following: if the observed probability distributions
are of the type of deterministic systems in science, the evidence speaks for a determinis-
tic description. Conversely, if the probability distributions are of the type of stochastic
processes in science, this provides evidence for a stochastic description. The idea here is
that the probability distributions characteristically found for deterministic (or stochastic)
descriptions in science provide inductive evidence for a deterministic (or stochastic) de-
scription. There is the question whether such an argument is convincing. Clearly, it can
only work if there is indeed a division between the respective probability distributions. So
let us ask: is there a deterministic system in science and is there an observation function
such that the deterministic system, when observed, yields a stochastic process in science?
4.1 Kolmogorov’s Conjecture
Kolmogorov found it hard to imagine a positive answer to this question. More specifi-
cally, it has been nearly forgotten (and has neither been subject to a systematic historical
investigation nor been discussed philosophically) that Kolmogorov conjectured the follow-
ing. Suppose an observed deterministic system yields a stochastic process in science; then
the observed deterministic system produces positive information. Contrary to this, any
arbitrary observation of a deterministic system in science never produces positive informa-
tion. Employing ideas in information theory, the Kolmogorov-Sinai entropy (KS-entropy)
was introduced to capture the highest amount of information, or equivalently the high-
est amount of uncertainty, that an observation of a deterministic system could produce;
where a positive KS-entropy indicates that there are observations which produce positive
information. Kolmogorov expected that the KS-entropy would accomplish the separation
of deterministic systems in science from the deterministic systems producing stochastic
processes in science: the former have zero entropy, the latter have positive entropy.
So it was a big surprise when, from the 1960s onwards, it was found that also many de-
terministic systems in science have positive KS-entropy and thus have observations which
produce positive information. Namely, all the deterministic systems listed in Subsection 3.1
as systems of physical relevance to which Theorem 1 applies have positive KS-entropy; in
particular, billiard systems with convex obstacles (Example 1), many hard-ball systems,
geodesic flows of constant negative curvature and Lorenz-type systems. For many systems
in science, such as for KAM-type systems, it is conjectured that they have positive KS-
entropy. Hence Kolmogorov’s attempt to separate deterministic systems in science from de-
terministic systems which produce stochastic processes in science failed (Radunskaya 1992,
8By ‘probability distributions’ I mean here nontrivial probability distributions (not all probabilities 0
or 1). Otherwise such a division could never exist. For consider a process composed of two semi-Markov
processes (Example 2), and an observation function which tells one whether the outcome is among those
of the first or the second process. Then the observed probability distribution is trivial.
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chapter 1; Sinai 1989, 835–837).
4.2 Deterministic Systems in Science Which Are Observation-
ally Equivalent to Stochastic Processes in Science
So is there a deterministic system in science and an observation such that the observed
deterministic system yields a stochastic process in science? To answer this, I need to
introduce the definitions of a continuous Bernoulli system and of isomorphism.
Intuitively speaking, Bernoulli systems are strongly chaotic.
Definition 4 The measure-preserving deterministic system (M,ΣM , µ, Tt) is a continuous
Bernoulli system iff for all t ∈ R\{0} the discrete measure-preserving deterministic system
(M,ΣM , µ, Tt) is a discrete Bernoulli system.
For the discussion in the main text, the details of this definition are not important.9 Here it
just matters that several deterministic systems in science are continuous Bernoulli system;
namely, all the systems listed in the previous subsection as systems with positive KS-
entropy, in particular, billiard systems with convex obstacles (Example 1), many hard-ball
systems, geodesic flows of constant negative curvature and Lorenz-type systems. Again,
for several systems, e.g., for the motion on unstable regions of KAM-type systems, it is
conjectured that they are continuous Bernoulli systems.
Isomorphic deterministic systems are probabilistically equivalent, i.e., their states can
be put into one-to-one correspondence (via a function φ) such that the corresponding
solutions have the same probability distributions.
Definition 5 The measure-preserving deterministic systems (M1,ΣM1 , µ1, T
1
t ) and
(M2,ΣM2 , µ2, T
2
t ) are isomorphic iff there are Mˆi ⊆Mi with µi(Mi\Mˆi) = 0 and T it Mˆi ⊆ Mˆi
for all t (i = 1, 2), and there is a bijection φ : Mˆ1→ Mˆ2 such that (i) φ(A)∈ΣM2 for all
A∈ΣM1 , A ⊆ Mˆ1, and φ−1(B) ∈ ΣM1 for all B ∈ ΣM2 , B ⊆ Mˆ2; (ii) µ2(φ(A)) = µ1(A) for
all A ∈ ΣM1 , A ⊆ Mˆ1; (iii) φ(T 1t (m)) = T 2t (φ(m)) for all m ∈ Mˆ1, t ∈ R.
Now assume that (M,ΣM , µ, Tt) is isomorphic (via φ : Mˆ → Mˆ2) to the deterministic
representation (M2,ΣM2 , µ2, T
2
t ) of the stochastic process {Zt; t ∈ R}. This means that
there is a one-to-one correspondence between the states of the system and the realisations
of the process. Recall that observing (M2,ΣM2 , µ2, T
2
t ) with Φ0 yields {Zt; t ∈ R} (where
Φ0(m2(τ)) = m2(0)). Consequently, (M,ΣM , µ, Tt) observed with the observation function
Φ := Φ0(φ(m)) is observationally equivalent to {Zt; t ∈ R}10
9A discrete Bernoulli system is defined as follows. Recall Definition 12 of a discrete measure-preserving
deterministic system. A doubly-infinite sequence of independent rolls of an N -sided die where the prob-
ability of obtaining sk is pk, 1 ≤ k ≤ N ,
∑N
k=1 pk = 1, is a Bernoulli process. Let M be the set of all
bi-infinite sequences m = (. . .m(−1),m(0),m(1) . . .) with m(i) ∈ M¯ = {s1, . . . , sN}. Let ΣM be the
σ-algebra generated by the cylinder-sets C
{sl1}...{sln}
i1...in
as defined in (1) with ij ∈ Z, slj ∈ M¯ . These sets
have probability µ¯(C
{sl1}...{sln}
i1...in
) = psl1 ...psln . Let µ the unique measure determined by µ¯ on ΣM . Let
T : M →M, T ((. . .m(i) . . .)) = (. . .m(i+ 1) . . .). (M,ΣM , µ, T ) is called a Bernoulli shift. Finally, a dis-
crete measure-preserving deterministic system is a Bernoulli system iff it is isomorphic to some Bernoulli
shift (isomorphism is exactly defined as for continuous time – see Definition 5).
10It does not matter how Φ0(φ(m)) is defined for m ∈M \ Mˆ .
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An important application of this principle is as follows. A deep result shows that
up to a scaling of time t any continuous Bernoulli systems are isomorphic. That is,
given continuous Bernoulli systems (M,ΣM , µ, Tt) and (M2,ΣM2 , µ2, T
2
t ) there is a c > 0
such that (M,ΣM , µ, Tt) and (M2,ΣM2 , µ2, T
2
ct) are isomorphic (Ornstein 1974). Now re-
call semi-Markov processes (Example 2). Ornstein (1970) proved that the determinis-
tic representation (M2,ΣM2 , µ2, T
2
t ) of any semi-Markov process is a continuous Bernoulli
system. Clearly, for any c ∈ R+, (M2,ΣM2 , µ2, T 2ct) is still the deterministic represen-
tation of a semi-Markov process. Therefore, given any continuous Bernoulli system in
science (M,ΣM , µ, Tt), there is a semi-Markov process whose deterministic representation
(M2,ΣM2 , µ2, T
2
ct) is isomorphic (via φ) to (M,ΣM , µ, Tt), implying that (M,ΣM , µ, Tt) ob-
served with Φ := Φ0(φ(m)) produces the semi-Markov process. For instance, billiards with
convex obstacles (Example 1) are continuous Bernoulli systems. Hence there is an obser-
vation function Φ which, applied to the billiard system, yields a semi-Markov processes.
The converse is also true: given any semi-Markov process, there is a Bernoulli system
in science which is observationally equivalent to the semi-Markov process. For given any
Bernoulli system in science (M,ΣM , µ, Tt), (M,ΣM , µ, Tct) is also a system in science (e.g.,
for billiard systems this means that the constant speed of the ball is changed from s
to cs). Thus given any semi-Markov process there is a deterministic system in science
(M,ΣM , µ, Tct) which is isomorphic to the deterministic representation (M2,ΣM2 , µ2, T
2
t )
of the semi-Markov process, implying that (M,ΣM , µ, Tct) observed with Φ := Φ0(φ(m))
yields the semi-Markov process. For instance, given any semi-Markov process (Example 2),
one can change the constant speed of a billiard system with convex obstacles such that an
observation of the billiard system yields the semi-Markov process.
To sum up, deterministic systems in science (namely, certain Bernoulli systems) are ob-
servationally equivalent to semi-Markov processes (which are widespread in science).11 For
discrete time Werndl (2009a, Section 4) showed that some deterministic systems in science
are observationally equivalent to Bernoulli processes or discrete-time Markov processes
(both are widespread in science). Yet this left open whether continuous-time deterministic
systems in science can yield stochastic processes in science. Indeed, Werndl’s results on
Bernoulli or Markov processes do not carry over to continuous time: Bernoulli processes are
only defined for discrete time and there are no deterministic systems in science which yield
continuous-time Markov processes. The latter holds because a deterministic system can
only be observationally equivalent to a continuous-time Markov process if the KS-entropy
of the Markov process is not higher than the KS-entropy of the system; but determinis-
tic systems in science have finite KS-entropy, and continuous-time Markov processes have
infinite KS-entropy (Feldman and Smorodinsky 1971; Ornstein and Weiss 1991, 19).
So I conclude that the answer to the question advanced at the beginning of this section
is positive: there are deterministic systems in science and observation functions such that
the deterministic systems, when observed, yield stochastic processes in science.12 So there is
observational equivalence not just to abstract mathematical descriptions (as shown in Sec-
tion 3)13 but a stronger form of observational equivalence between descriptions in science.
11n-step semi-Markov processes are continuous Bernoulli systems too (Ornstein 1974). Therefore, an
analogous argument shows that Bernoulli systems in science are observationally equivalent to n-step semi-
Markov processes.
12My arguments allow any meaning of ‘deterministic systems deriving from scientific theories’ that
excludes the deterministic representation but is wide enough to include some continuous Bernoulli systems.
13Also, compared to the results in Section 3, the results here concern a narrower class of descriptions,
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Thus any argument that a phenomenon is best described as deterministic or stochastic
(such as the one sketched at the beginning of this section) cannot work when it relies on
the premise that there is a division between the probability distributions of deterministic
and stochastic descriptions in science.
5 Observational Equivalence: Results III
In the previous section we have seen that there are some observations of deterministic
systems in science which yield stochastic processes in science. Now let us ask whether an
even stronger result holds. Namely, can deterministic systems in science and stochastic
processes in science be observationally equivalent at every observation level (and not just
for some observation)? Note that, compared to the previous section, the type of systems
considered remain the same, namely deterministic and stochastic descriptions in science.
Intuitively, one might think that deterministic systems in science can yield stochastic
processes in science only if specific coarse observation functions are applied. If this is true,
fine-enough observations of deterministic systems in science would yield different proba-
bility distributions than stochastic processes in science. Then, if one wants to find out
whether a phenomenon is best described as deterministic or stochastic, one might argue
the following: if fine observations yield probability distributions characteristically found
for deterministic systems in science, the evidence favours a deterministic description. The
idea here is that the existence of characteristic probability distributions for deterministic
systems found in science gives us inductive evidence that a phenomenon is best described
as deterministic. Such an argument is only tenable if fine-enough observations of deter-
ministic systems indeed yield special probability distributions, i.e., if the question whether
deterministic systems in science can be observationally equivalent at every observation level
to stochastic processes in science has a negative answer. So let us focus on this question.
5.1 The Meaning of Observational Equivalence at Every Ob-
servation Level
What does it mean that ‘stochastic processes of a certain type are observationally equivalent
to a deterministic system at every observation level ’? I will first introduce the standard
notion and then two new notions. I focus on measure-preserving deterministic systems
and, correspondingly, stationary stochastic processes because all examples will be of this
kind.
The usual meaning based on ε-congruence
To introduce the standard notion, I start by explaining what it means for a deterministic
system and a stochastic process to give the same predictions at an observation level ε >
0, ε ∈ R. For sufficiently small ε1 > 0 one cannot distinguish states of the deterministic
system which are less than the distance ε1 apart. Also, for sufficiently small ε2 > 0 one
will not be able to distinguish differences in probabilities of less than ε2. Assume that
ε < min{ε1, ε2}. Then a deterministic system and a stochastic process give the same
namely only continuous Bernoulli systems, semi-Markov processes and n-step semi-Markov processes.
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predictions at level ε iff the following shadowing result holds: the solutions can be put
into one-to-one correspondence with the realisations such that the state of the system and
the outcome of the process are at all time points within distance ε except for a set of
probability smaller than ε.
ε-congruence captures this idea mathematically (one assumes that a metric dM measures
distances between states and that the possible outcomes of the process are in M ; also,
recall the deterministic representation as discussed in Subsection 3.2 and Definition 5 of
isomorphism):
Definition 6 Let (M,ΣM ,µ,Tt) be a measure-preserving deterministic system, where (M,dM)
is a metric space. Let (M2,ΣM2 , µ2, T
2
t ) be the deterministic representation of the stochas-
tic process {Zt; t ∈ R} and let Φ0 : M2 → M, Φ0(m2(τ)) = m2(0). (M,ΣM , µ, Tt)
is ε-congruent to {Zt; t ∈ R} iff (M,ΣM , µ, Tt) is isomorphic via φ : M → M2 to
(M2,ΣM2 , µ2, T
2
t ) and dM(m,Φ0(φ(m)))<ε for all m∈M except for a set of measure<ε.
Now we generalise over ε and arrive at a plausible meaning of the phrase that ‘stochastic
processes of a certain type are observationally equivalent at every observation level to a
deterministic system’. Namely: for every ε > 0 there is a process of this type which is
ε-congruent to the system (cf. Ornstein and Weiss 1991, 22–23; Suppes 1999).
The idea for new notions of observational equivalence at every observation level starts
from the following thought. ε-congruence does not assume that the system is observed with
an observation function: the actual states of the deterministic system, not the observed
ones, are compared with the outcomes of the stochastic process. To arrive at a notion of
observational equivalence, no observation functions are invoked, but it is asked whether
the state of the system and the outcome of the process are less than ε apart. (I should
mention that if (M,ΣM , µ, Tt) and {Zt; t ∈ R} are ε-congruent, then {Ψ(Tt); t ∈ R},
where Ψ(m) := Φ0(φ(m)), is the process {Zt; t ∈ R}. Technically, Ψ is an observation
function but for ε-congruence it is not interpreted in this way. Instead, the meaning of Ψ is
as follows: when it is applied to the system, the resulting process shadows the deterministic
system.)
In many contexts, such as in Newtonian and statistical mechanics, observations are
modeled by observation functions, and one would like to know what happens when specific
observation functions are applied. Thus it would be desirable to have a notion of obser-
vational equivalence at every observation level based on observation functions. Results
about other notions might be regarded as wanting because they leave unclear what hap-
pens when observation functions are applied. As explained, ε-congruence is not based on
observation functions. For this reason, I now introduce two other notions of observational
equivalence at every observation level. Whether a notion is preferable that (i) tells one
what happens when one cannot distinguish between states which are less than ε apart
(such as the notion based on ε-congruence) or (ii) tells one what stochastic processes are
obtained if specific observation functions are applied (such as the notions introduced in
the next two paragraphs) will depend on the modeling process and the phenomenon under
consideration.
A new meaning based on strong (Φ, ε)-simulation
First, I have to explain what it means for a stochastic process and a deterministic system
as observed with an observation function Φ to give the same predictions relative to accu-
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racy ε > 0, ε ∈ R+ (ε indicates that one cannot distinguish differences in probabilistic
predictions of less than ε). Plausibly, this means that the possible observed values of the
system and the possible outcomes of the process coincide, and that the probabilistic pre-
dictions of the observed deterministic system and of the stochastic process differ by less
than ε. Strong (Φ, ε)-simulation captures this idea mathematically. I assume that Φ is
finite-valued, as it is in practice.
Definition 7 {Zt; t ∈ R} strongly (Φ, ε)-simulates a measure-preserving deterministic
system (M,ΣM , µ, Tt), where Φ : M → M¯ is a surjective finite-valued observation function,
iff there is a surjective measurable function Ψ : M → M¯ such that (i) Zt = Ψ(Tt) for all
t ∈ R and (ii) µ({m ∈M |Ψ(m) 6= Φ(m)}) < ε.
By generalising over Φ and ε one obtains a plausible meaning of the notion that pro-
cesses of a certain type are observationally equivalent at every observation level to a system.
Namely: for every finite-valued Φ and every ε there is a stochastic process of this type which
strongly (Φ, ε)-simulates the deterministic system. This notion is attractive because it tells
us what probability distributions are obtained when any finite-valued observation function
is applied. Yet, to my knowledge, it has not been discussed before.
A new meaning based on weak (Φ, ε)-simulation
If one asks whether the probability distributions obtained by applying Φ to the determin-
istic system could derive from a stochastic process of a certain kind, the notion of strong
(Φ, ε)-simulation is stronger than what is needed. Is suffices that the observed probability
distributions could result from an observation of a stochastic process of a certain kind (this
will be of some relevance later – see the end of Subsection 5.2). More specifically, if suffices
to require the following. Given a deterministic system observed with Φ, there is an observa-
tion Γ of a stochastic process such that the following holds: the possible observed outcomes
of the process are the possible observed values of the deterministic system, and the proba-
bilistic predictions of the process observed with Γ and the probabilistic predictions of the
system observed with Φ differ by less than ε. Technically, weak (Φ, ε)-simulation captures
this idea.
Definition 8 {Zt; t ∈ R} weakly (Φ, ε)-simulates a measure-preserving deterministic sys-
tem (M,ΣM , µ, Tt), where Φ : M → M¯ is a surjective finite-valued observation func-
tion, iff there is a surjective measurable function Ψ : M → S and a surjective ob-
servation function Γ : S → M¯ such that (i) Γ(Zt) = Ψ(Tt) for all t ∈ R and (ii)
µ({m ∈M |Ψ(m) 6= Φ(m)}) < ε.
Clearly, if a stochastic process strongly (Φ, ε)-simulates a system, it also weakly (Φ, ε)-
simulates it (choose Γ(s) = s). The converse is generally not true. By generalising over Φ
and ε, one obtains a plausible meaning of the notion that stochastic processes of a certain
type are observationally equivalent at every observation level to a deterministic system.
Namely: for every finite-valued Φ and every ε there is a process of this type which weakly
(Φ, ε)-simulates the system. To my knowledge, this notion has never been discussed.
According to all three notions, at every observation level, the data could derive from
the deterministic system or a stochastic process of a certain type. So let us see what results
obtain for the three notions.
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5.2 Stochastic Processes in Science Which Are Observation-
ally Equivalent at Every Observation Level to Determinis-
tic Systems in Science
The next three theorems show that the following holds for our three notions: continuous
Bernoulli systems (Definition 4), including several systems in science, are observationally
equivalent at every observation level to semi-Markov processes (notion one and three) or
n-step semi-Markov processes (notion two), which are widespread in science.
Theorem 2 Let (M,ΣM , µ, Tt) be a continuous Bernoulli system where the metric space
(M,dM) is separable
14 and ΣM contains all open sets of (M,dM). Then for every ε > 0,
(M,ΣM , µ, Tt) is ε-congruent to a semi-Markov process.
For a proof see Ornstein and Weiss (1991, 93–94). The assumptions of this theorem are ful-
filled by all continuous Bernoulli systems in science. For discrete time Werndl (2009a, Sec-
tion 4) showed that several deterministic systems in science are ε-congruent for all ε > 0
to discrete-time Markov processes (which are widespread in science). However, this left
open whether continuous-time deterministic systems in science can be ε-congruent for all
ε > 0 to continuous-time stochastic processes in science. Indeed, Werndl’s (2009a) results
on Markov processes do not carry over to continuous time because, as explained at the end
of Subsection 4.2, deterministic systems in science cannot yield continuous-time Markov
processes.
Theorem 3 Let (M,ΣM , µ, Tt) be a continuous Bernoulli system. Then for every finite-
valued observation function Φ and every ε > 0 there is an n such that an n-step semi-
Markov process strongly (Φ, ε)-simulates (M,ΣM , µ, Tt).
For a proof see Ornstein and Weiss (1991, 94–95).
Theorem 4 Let (M,ΣM , µ, Tt) be a continuous Bernoulli system. Then for every finite-
valued observation function Φ and every ε > 0 a semi-Markov process {Zt, t ∈ R} weakly
(Φ, ε)-simulates (M,ΣM , µ, Tt).
For a proof, see Subsection 8.3.
For instance, consider a billiard system with convex obstacles (Example 1). According
to Theorem 2, the solutions of such a billiard system are shadowed by the realisations of a
semi-Markov process for any accuracy ε. According to Theorem 3, such a billiard system,
observed with any finite-valued observation function, is observationally equivalent to an
n-step semi-Markov process (disregarding differences in probabilistic predictions of less
than ε). According to Theorem 4, such a billiard system, observed with any finite-valued
observation function, gives the same predictions as some observed semi-Markov process
(disregarding differences in probabilistic predictions of less than ε).
Consequently, I conclude that the answer to the question advanced at the beginning of
this section is positive: there are deterministic systems in science which are observationally
equivalent to stochastic processes in science at every observation level. Compared to the
14(M,dM ) is separable iff there is a countable set M˜ = {mn |n ∈ N} with mn ∈ M such that every
nonempty open subset of M contains at least one element of M˜ .
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results in Section 4 these results are stronger because there is observational equivalence at
every observation level (and not just for some observation).15 Note that the increase in
strength is very different for the move from the first to the second results (observational
equivalence not just to abstract mathematical descriptions but between descriptions in
science) and for the move from the second to the third results (observational equivalence
between descriptions in science at every, and not just at some, observation level). The
third results imply that arguments that the evidence favours a deterministic description
fail when they rely on the premise that fine-enough observations of deterministic systems
in science yield probability distributions different from the ones of stochastic processes in
science. And for this reason the argument advanced at the beginning of this subsection
fails. This, of course, is not to claim that there can be no sound arguments for preferring
a deterministic or stochastic description, but just that arguments based on alleged general
differences between probability distributions of deterministic and stochastic descriptions
in science will not work.16
In this context note the following. Assume one wants to find out, by applying obser-
vation functions, whether the evidence favours a deterministic or stochastic description.
According to Theorem 3, certain deterministic systems are observationally equivalent at
every observation level to n-step semi-Markov processes. Scientists use n-step semi-Markov
processes in many contexts (from physics and biology to the social sciences) where they
do not, and we think it is rational that they do not, automatically conclude that this in-
dicates a deterministic description. Thus it is plausible to argue that n-step semi-Markov
processes do not indicate deterministic descriptions. Still, n-step semi-Markov processes
show correlations in the following sense: the next outcome depends on the past n outcomes,
not only on the previous outcome. Suppose that, because of this, n-step semi-Markov pro-
cesses are taken to indicate a deterministic description. Then one still cannot conclude that
fine-enough observations of Bernoulli systems indicate deterministic descriptions. This is
so because all one needs is that the observed probability distributions could derive from
stochastic process showing no correlations. And, according to Theorem 4, all observations
could derive from semi-Markov processes, where the next outcome depends only on the
past outcome and thus there are no such correlations.17
All in all, the results on observational equivalence are stronger than what one might
have expected: observational equivalence holds even between deterministic and stochastic
descriptions found in science at every observation level.
6 Previous Philosophical Discussion
There are hardly any philosophical reflections in the mathematics literature on observa-
tional equivalence. Because I discussed the continuous-time results, I can comment on the
main exception:
15The results here concern the same kind of descriptions as in Section 4, namely continuous Bernoulli
systems, semi-Markov processes and n-step semi-Markov processes.
16The question of which description is preferable is an interesting one but requires another paper. Werndl
(2011) is a paper devoted to this question.
17It seems worth noting that for the semi-Markov processes of Theorem 4 any arbitrary outcome will
be followed by at least two different outcomes. And for many Bernoulli systems any of these semi-Markov
processes is such that none of the transition probabilities is close to 0 or 1 (see Subsection 8.3).
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Our theorem [Theorem 2] also tells us that certain semi-Markov systems could
be thought of as being produced by Newton’s laws (billiards seen through a
deterministic viewer) or by coin-flipping. This may mean that there is no
philosophical distinction between processes governed by roulette wheels and
processes governed by Newton’s laws. {The popular literature emphasises the
distinction between “deterministic chaos” and “real randomness”.} In this con-
nection we should note that our model for a stationary process (§ 1.2) [the
deterministic representation] means that random processes have a determinis-
tic model. This model, however, is abstract, and there is no reason to believe
that it can be endowed with any special additional structure. Our point is
that we are comparing, in a strong sense, Newton’s laws and coin flipping.18
(Ornstein and Weiss 1991, 39–40)
It is hard to tell what this comment expresses because it is vague and unclear.19 For in-
stance, why do Ornstein and Weiss highlight coin flipping even though Theorem 2 does not
tell us anything about coin flipping (Bernoulli processes) but only about semi-Markov pro-
cesses? Disregarding that, possibly, Ornstein and Weiss think that semi-Markov processes
are random and hence claim that both deterministic and stochastic descriptions can be
random. This is widely acknowledged in philosophy (e.g., Eagle 2005). Or maybe Ornstein
and Weiss (1991) want to say that deterministic systems in science, when observed with
specific observation functions, can be observationally equivalent to stochastic processes in
science or, if semi-Markov processes are random, even random processes.20 This is true and
important. However, as discussed in Section 4, this was generally known before Theorem 2
was proven and has been established by theorems which are weaker than Theorem 2. One
might have expected Ornstein and Weiss (1991) to say that Theorem 2 shows what I argued
that it does, namely that deterministic systems in science are observationally equivalent
at every observation level to stochastic processes in science (cf. Subsection 5.2). But they
do not seem to say this: because, if they did, it would be unclear why the deterministic
representation is mentioned; also, they do not talk about all possible observation levels.
In any case, even if Theorem 2 establishes observational equivalence, it is not true that
“this may mean that there is no philosophical distinction between processes governed by
roulette wheels and processes governed by Newton’s laws” in the sense that there is no
conceptual distinction between deterministic and indeterministic descriptions. Regardless
of any results on observational equivalence, this distinction remains.
In the philosophy literature the significance of Theorem 2 is taken to be that (at every
observation level) there is a choice between a deterministic description in science and a
stochastic process: “What is fundamental is that [...] we are in a position to choose either
between a deterministic or stochastic model” (Suppes and de Barros 1996, 196). “The
fact that a Bernoulli flow can be partitioned in such a way as to yield a (semi-) Markov
process illustrates what has been acknowledged all along: Some deterministic systems,
when partitioned, generate stochastic processes” (Winnie 1998, 317).
18The text in braces is in a footnote.
19Ornstein and Weiss are mathematicians and not philosophers. So one should not blame them for
misguided philosophical claims. Still, one needs to know whether their philosophical claims are tenable;
thus I criticise them.
20If (M,ΣM , µ, Tt) and a semi-Markov process {Zt; t ∈ R} are ε-congruent, there is a finite-valued Φ
such that {Φ(Tt); t ∈ R} is {Zt; t ∈ R} (cf. Subsection 5.1).
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Theorem 2 indeed implies that there is a choice (at every observation level) between
deterministic descriptions in science and stochastic descriptions. Yet note that this is
already shown by the first level (cf. Subsection 3.1). For Theorem 1 already shows that for
every finite-valued observation function there is a choice between a nontrivial stochastic or a
deterministic description. This implies that, according to our first notion, the deterministic
systems to which Theorem 1 applies are observationally equivalent at every observation
level to nontrivial stochastic processes. Formally:
Proposition 1 Let (M,ΣM , µ, Tt) be a measure-preserving deterministic system where
(M,dM) is separable and where ΣM contains all open sets of (M,dM). Assume that
(M,ΣM , µ, Tt) satisfies the assumption of Theorem 1 and has finite KS-entropy.
21 Then
for every ε > 0 there is a stochastic process {Zt; t ∈ R} with outcome space MO = ∪hl=1ol,
h ∈ N, such that {Zt; t ∈ R} is ε-congruent to (M,ΣM , µ, Tt), and for all k ∈ R+ there
are oi, oj ∈MO such that 0 < P{Zt+k=oj |Zt=oi} < 1.
This proposition is easy to establish (see Subsection 8.4). And, clearly, according to the
second and third notion, every deterministic system (M,ΣM , µ, Tt) to which Theorem 1
applies is observationally equivalent at every observation level to nontrivial stochastic pro-
cesses. This is so because the second and third notion quantifies over all finite-valued
observations Φ, and {Φ(Tt); t ∈ R} is nontrivial by Theorem 1. Thus {Φ(Tt); t ∈ R}
strongly and weakly (Φ, ε)-simulates (M,ΣM , µ, Tt) for every ε > 0.
The significance of a theorem is constituted by the new knowledge added and by the
conclusions shown by the theorem that have not already been shown by weaker theorems.
As just explained, that there is a choice between deterministic and stochastic descriptions
follows from much weaker theorems than Theorem 2 and was known to the community
long before Theorem 2 was proven. Consequently, the choice (at every observation level)
between a deterministic description in science and a stochastic description cannot be the
significance of Theorem 2. Instead, its significance is that deterministic systems in science
are observationally equivalent at every observation level even to stochastic processes of the
kinds found in science.22
Moreover, Suppes and de Barros (1996, 198–200) and Suppes (1999, 189, 192) seem
to think that what it means for a deterministic system to be ε-congruent to a certain
type of stochastic process for every ε > 0 (the first notion of observational equivalence) is
that the system observed with any finite-valued observation function yields a process of a
certain type: “we can form a finite partition [...] of the phase space of possible trajectories”
(Suppes 1999, 189). That is, they seem to think that the first notion of observational
equivalence expresses something like my second notion. But, as discussed in Subsection 5.1,
the first and the second notion are quite different (e.g., only the latter tells us what happens
if any arbitrary finite-valued observation function is applied).
21Deterministic systems in science have finite KS-entropy (Ornstein and Weiss 1991, 19).
22Suppes (1999, 182) and Winnie (1998, 317) similarly claim that the philosophical significance of the
result that some discrete-time systems are ε-congruent for all ε > 0 to discrete-time Markov processes is
that there is a choice between deterministic and stochastic descriptions. Werndl (2009a, Section 4.2.2)
already criticised that these claims are too weak but did not explain why (so I did this here).
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7 Conclusion
This paper presented and philosophically assessed three types of results on the observational
equivalence of deterministic and indeterministic descriptions. These results were about
continuous-time measure-theoretic deterministic systems and stochastic processes, which
are ubiquitous in science. The main contribution of this paper was to show that there are
results on observational equivalence for continuous-time descriptions of increasing strength
(namely, about descriptions in science and for every observation level) and to assess their
philosophical significance and consequences.
The first results were about observational equivalence to abstract mathematical descrip-
tions. I showed how, when starting with deterministic systems, one finds observationally
equivalent stochastic processes, and conversely. The second results were stronger in the
sense that they were not about observational equivalence to abstract mathematical de-
scriptions but showed observational equivalence between descriptions of the types found in
science. They establish, e.g., that billiard systems with convex obstacles are observationally
equivalent to semi-Markov processes. Here I also discussed Kolmogorov’s failed attempt to
separate deterministic systems in science from deterministic systems which yield stochas-
tic processes in science. Compared to the second results, the third results were stronger
because they concerned observational equivalence between descriptions in science at every
(and not just at some) observation level. I introduced two new meanings of ‘observational
equivalence at every observation level’. And I showed that deterministic systems in science
can be observationally equivalent even at every observation level to stochastic processes in
science. For example, billiard systems with convex obstacles are observationally equivalent
at every observation level to semi-Markov or n-step semi-Markov processes.
A consequence of these results is as follows. Suppose one wants to find out whether
a phenomenon is best described as deterministic or stochastic. Then one might think of
arguing that there is evidence for a deterministic or stochastic description by appealing to
the difference between the probability distributions of stochastic processes in science and
the probability distributions of (possibly fine-enough) observations of deterministic systems
in science. The results of this paper showed that such arguments fail because there is no
general difference between the respective probability distributions.
What, then, can we say about the question of whether the deterministic or indeter-
ministic description is preferable? Let me briefly outline my view on this issue. For a
thorough treatment, the reader is referred to Werndl (2011). Generally, the answer to
this question will vary: in some contexts the deterministic description, in others the in-
deterministic description might be preferable, and in still other contexts there might be
underdetermination. But I argue that there is a clear answer for the specific case of the
choice between a deterministic description D which follows from Newtonian mechanics and
an indeterministic description I which does not follow from any theory. This includes the
main example considered by the extant literature, namely the Newtonian deterministic
description of the billiard ball and the corresponding stochastic description which does not
follow from any theory. Here the same probabilistic predictions follow from D and I. Still,
there are many descriptions in Newtonian mechanics which are not derivable from D or I
and which are supported by evidence. Because of the unifying power of Newtonian me-
chanics, these descriptions provide indirect evidence for D but not for the indeterministic
description I. Hence, for these specific cases, indirect evidence provides a reason to prefer
22
the deterministic description.
8 Appendix
8.1 Semi-Markov and n-step Semi-Markov Processes
First, we need the following definition.
Definition 9 A discrete stochastic process {Zt; t ∈ Z} is a family of random variables
Zt, t ∈ Z, from a probability space (Ω,ΣΩ, ν) to a measurable space (M¯,ΣM¯).
Semi-Markov and n-step semi-Markov processes are defined via Markov and n-step Markov
processes (for a definition of these well-known processes, see Doob (1953), where it is also
explained what it means for these processes to be irreducible and aperiodic).
A semi-Markov process23 is defined with help of a discrete stochastic process
{(Sk, Tk), k ∈ Z}. {Sk; k ∈ Z} describes the successive outcomes si visited by the semi-
Markov process, where at time 0 the outcome is S0. T0 is the time interval after which
there is the first jump of the semi-Markov process after the time 0, T−1 is the time interval
after which there is the last jump of the process before time 0, and all other Tk similarly de-
scribe the time-intervals between jumps of the process. Because at time 0 the semi-Markov
process is in S0 and the process is in S0 for the time u(S0), T−1 = u(S0)− T0.
Technically, {(Sk, Tk), k ∈ Z} satisfies the following conditions: (i) Sk∈S={s1, . . . , sN},
N ∈ N; Tk ∈ U = {u1, . . . , uN¯}, N¯ ∈ N, N¯ ≤ N , for k 6= 0,−1, where ui ∈ R+, 1 ≤ i ≤ N¯ ;
T0 ∈ (0, u(S0)], T−1 ∈ [0, u(S0)), where u : S → U, si → u(si), is surjective; and hence
M¯ = S×[0,maxi ui]; (ii) ΣM¯ = P(S)×L([0,maxi ui]), where L([0,maxi ui]) is the Lebesgue
σ-algebra on [0,maxi ui]; (iii) {Sk; k ∈ Z} is a stationary irreducible and aperiodic Markov
process with outcome space S; psi = P{S0 = si} > 0, for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N ; (iv) Tk = u(Sk)
for k ≥ 1, Tk = u(Sk−1) for k ≤ −2, and T−1 = u(S0) − T0; (v) for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N ,
P (T0 ∈ A |S0 = si) =
∫
A
1/u(si)dλ for all A ∈ L((0, u(si)]), where L((0, u(si)]) is the
Lebesgue σ-algebra and λ is the Lebesgue measure on (0, u(si)].
Definition 10 A semi-Markov process is a process {Zt; t ∈ R} with outcome space S
constructed via a process {(Sk, Tk), k ∈ Z} as follows:
Zt =S0 for − T−1 ≤ t < T0,
Zt =Sk for T0 + . . .+ Tk−1 ≤ t < T0 + . . .+ Tk; k ≥ 1 and thus t ≥ T0,
Zt =S−k for−T−1−. . .−T−k−1 ≤ t <−T−1−. . .−T−k; k ≥ 1 and thus t <−T−1,
and for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N ,
P (Z0 = si) =
psiu(si)
ps1u(s1) + . . .+ psNu(sN)
. (2)
Semi-Markov processes are stationary (Ornstein 1970 and 1974, 56–61). In this paper
I assume that the elements of U are irrationally related (ui and uj are irrationally related
23The term ‘semi-Markov process’ is not defined unambiguously. I follow Ornstein and Weiss (1991).
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iff ui
uj
is irrational; and the elements of U = {u1, . . . , uN¯} are irrationally related iff for all
i, j, i 6= j, ui and uj are irrationally related).
n-step semi-Markov processes24 generalise semi-Markov processes.
Definition 11 n-step semi-Markov processes are defined like semi-Markov processes ex-
cept that condition (iii) is replaced by: (iii’) {Sk; k ∈ Z} is a stationary irreducible and
aperiodic n-step Markov process with outcome space S and psi = P{S0 = si} > 0, for all
i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N .
Again, n-step semi-Markov processes are stationary (Park 1982), and I assume that the
elements of U are irrationally related.
8.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Iff for a measure-preserving deterministic system (M,ΣM , µ, Tt) there does not exist a
n ∈ R+ and a C ∈ ΣM , 0 < µ(C) < 1, such that, except for a set of measure zero (esmz.)
Tn(C) = C, then the following holds: for every nontrivial finite-valued observation function
Φ : M → MO, every k ∈ R+ and {Zt; t ∈ R} = {Φ(Tt); t ∈ R} there are oi, oj ∈ MO with
0 < P{Zt+k=oj |Zt=oi} < 1.
Proof : We need the following definitions.
Definition 12 A discrete measure-preserving deterministic system is a quadruple
(M,ΣM , µ, T ) where (M,ΣM , µ) is a probability space and T : M → M is a bijective
measurable function such that T−1 is measurable and µ(T (A)) = µ(A) for all A ∈ ΣM .
Definition 13 A discrete measure-preserving deterministic system (M,ΣM , µ, T ) is ergodic
iff there is no A ∈ ΣM , 0 < µ(A) < 1, such that, esmz., T (A) = A.
(M,ΣM , µ, T ) is ergodic iff for all A,B ∈ ΣM (Cornfeld et al. 1982, 14–15):
lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
(µ(T n(A) ∩B)− µ(A)µ(B)) = 0. (3)
Definition 14 α = {α1, . . . , αn}, n ∈ N, is a partition of (M,ΣM , µ) iff αi ∈ ΣM , µ(αi) >
0, for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, αi ∩ αj = ∅ for all i 6= j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, and M =
⋃n
i=1 αi.
A partition is nontrivial iff n ≥ 2. Given two partitions α = {α1, . . . , αn} and β =
{β1, . . . , βl} of (M,ΣM , µ), α∨β is the partition {αi∩βj | i = 1, . . . , n; j = 1, . . . , l}. Given
a deterministic system (M,ΣM , µ, Tt), if α is a partition, Ttα = {Tt(α1), . . . , Tt(αn)}, t ∈ R,
is also a partition.
Note that any finite-valued observation function Φ (cf. Subsection 2.1) can be written
as: Φ(m) =
∑n
i=1 oiχαi(m), MO = {oi | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}, for some partition α of (M,ΣM , µ),
where χA is the characteristic function of A (cf. Cornfeld et al. 1982, 179).
25 It suffices to
prove the following:
24Again, the term ‘n-step semi-Markov process’ is not used unambiguously; I follow Ornstein and Weiss
(1991).
25That is, χA(m) = 1 for m ∈ A and 0 otherwise.
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(∗) Iff for (M,ΣM , µ, Tt) there does not exist an n ∈ R+ and a C ∈ ΣM ,
0 < µ(C) < 1, such that, esmz., Tn(C) = C, then the following holds: for
any nontrivial partition α = {α1, . . . , αr}, r ∈ N, and all k ∈ R+ there is an
i ∈ {1, . . . , r} such that for all j, 1≤j≤r, µ(Tk(αi)\αj)>0.
For finite-valued observation functions are of the form
∑r
l=1 olχαl(m), where α = {α1, . . . , αr}
is a partition and MO = ∪rl=1ol. Consequently, the right hand side of (∗) expresses that for
any nontrivial finite-valued Φ : M →MO and all k ∈ R+ there is an oi ∈MO such that for
all oj ∈ MO, P{Zt+k = oj |Zt = oi} < 1, or equivalently, that there are oi, oj ∈ MO with
0 < P{Zt+k=oj |Zt=oi} < 1.
⇐: Assume that there is an n ∈ R+ and a C ∈ ΣM , 0 < µ(C) < 1, such that,
esmz., Tn(C) = C. Then for α = {C,M \ C} it holds that µ(Tn(C) \ C) = 0 and
µ(Tn(M \ C) \ (M \ C)) = 0.
⇒: Assume that the conclusion of (∗) does not hold, and hence that there is a nontrivial
partition α and a k ∈ R+ such that for each αi there is an αj with, esmz., Tk(αi) ⊆ αj.
From the assumptions it follows that for every k ∈ R+ the discrete deterministic system
(M,ΣM , µ, Tk) is ergodic (cf. Definition 13).
Case 1 : For every i there is a j such that, esmz., Tk(αi) = αj. Because the dis-
crete system (M,ΣM , µ, Tk) is ergodic (equation (3)), there is an h ∈ N such that, esmz.,
Tkh(α1) = α1. But this is in contradiction with the assumption that it is not the case that
there exists an n ∈ R+ and a C ∈ ΣM , 0 < µ(C) < 1, such that, esmz., Tn(C) = C.
Case 2 : There exists an i and a j with, esmz., Tk(αi) ⊂ αj and with µ(αi) < µ(αj).
Because the discrete system (M,ΣM , µ, Tk) is ergodic (equation (3)), there is a h ∈ N such
that, esmz., Thk(αj) ⊆ αi. Hence µ(αj) ≤ µ(αi), contradicting µ(αi) < µ(αj) ≤ µ(αi).
8.3 Proof of Theorem 4
Theorem 4 Let (M,ΣM , µ, Tt) be a continuous Bernoulli system. Then for every finite-
valued Φ and every ε > 0 a semi-Markov process {Zt, t ∈ R} weakly (Φ, ε)-simulates
(M,ΣM , µ, Tt).
Proof : Let (M,ΣM , µ, Tt) be a continuous Bernoulli system, let Φ : M → S, S = {s1, . . . , sN},
N ∈ N, be a surjective observation function, and let ε > 0. Theorem 3 implies that there
is a surjective observation function Θ : M → S, Θ(m) =∑Ni=1 siχαi(m), for a partition α
(cf. Definition 14), such that {Yt = Θ(Tt); t ∈ R} is an n-step semi-Markov process with
outcomes si and corresponding times u(si) which strongly (Φ, ε)-simulates (M,ΣM , µ, Tt).
I need the following definition:
Definition 15 (M2,ΣM2 , µ2, T
2
t ) is a factor of (M1,ΣM1 , µ1, T
1
t ) (where both deterministic
systems measure-preserving) iff there are Mˆi ⊆ Mi with µi(Mi \ Mˆi) = 0, T it Mˆi ⊆ Mˆi
for all t (i = 1, 2), and there is a function φ : Mˆ1 → Mˆ2 such that (i) φ−1(B) ∈ ΣM1
for all B ∈ ΣM2 , A ⊆ Mˆ2; (ii) µ1(φ−1(B)) = µ2(B) for all B ∈ ΣM2 , B ⊆ Mˆ2; (iii)
φ(T 1t (m)) = T
2
t (φ(m)) for all m ∈ Mˆ1, t ∈ R.
Note that the deterministic representation (X,ΣX , µX ,Wt,Λ0) of {Yt; t ∈ R} is a factor of
(M,ΣM , µ, Tt) via φ(m) = rm (rm is the realisation of m) (cf. Ornstein and Weiss, 1991, 18).
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Now I construct a measure-preserving system (K,ΣK , µK , Rt) as follows. Let
(Ω,ΣΩ, µΩ, V,Ξ0), Ξ0(ω) =
∑N
i=1 siχβi(ω), where β is a partition, be the deterministic
representation of {Sk; k ∈ Z}, the irreducible and aperiodic n-step Markov process cor-
responding to {Yt; t ∈ R}. Let f : Ω → {u1, . . . , uN}, f(ω) = u(Ξ0(ω)). Define K
as ∪Ni=1Ki = ∪Ni=1(βi × [0, u(si))). Let ΣKi , 1 ≤ i ≤ N , be the product σ-algebra
(ΣΩ ∩ βi) × L([0, u(si))) where L([0, u(si))) is the Lebesgue σ-algebra of [0, u(si)). Let
µKi be the product measure
(µΣΩ∩βiΩ × λ([0, u(si))))/
N∑
j=1
u(sj)µΩ(βj), (4)
where λ([0, u(si))) is the Lebesgue measure on [0, u(si)) and µ
ΣΩ∩βi
Ω is the measure µΩ
restricted to ΣΩ∩βi. Let ΣK be the σ-algebra generated by ∪Ni=1ΣKi . Define a pre-measure
µ¯K on H = (∪Ni=1(ΣΩ∩βi×L([0, si))))∪K by µ¯K(K) = 1 and µ¯K(A) = µKi(A) for A ∈ ΣKi ,
and let µK be the unique extension of this pre-measure to a measure on ΣK . Finally, Rt is
defined as follows: let the state of the system at time zero be (k, v) ∈ K, k ∈ Ω, v < f(k);
the state moves vertically with unit velocity, and just before it reaches (k, f(k)) it jumps
to (V (k), 0) at time f(k) − v; then it again moves vertically with unit velocity, and just
before it reaches (V (k), f(V (k)))) it jumps to (V 2(k), 0) at time f(V (k)) + f(k)− v, and
so on. (K,ΣK , µK , Rt) is a measure-preserving system (a ‘flow built under the function
f ’). (X,ΣX , µX ,Wt) is proven to be isomorphic (via a function ψ) to (K,ΣK , µK , Rt)
(Park 1982).
Consider γ = {γ1, . . . , γl}=β∨V β∨ . . .∨V n−1β and Π(ω) =
∑l
j=1 ojχγj(ω), oi 6= oj for
i 6= j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ l. I now show that {Bt = Π(V t(ω)); t ∈ Z} is an irreducible and aperiodic
Markov process. By construction, for all t and all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ l, there are qi,0, . . . , qi,n−1 ∈ S
such that
P{Bt = oi} = P{St = qi,0, St+1 = qi,1, . . . , St+n−1 = qi,n−1}. (5)
Therefore, for all k ∈ N and all i, j1, . . . , jk, 1 ≤ i, j1, . . . , jk ≤ l:
P{Bt+1 = oi |Bt = oj1 , . . . , Bt−k+1 = ojk} = (6)
P{St+1=qi,0,..., St+n=qi,n−1|St=qj1,0,..., St+n−1=qi,n−2,St−1=qj2,0,..., St−k+1=qjk,0}
= P{St+1 = qi,0, . . . , St+n = qi,n−1 |St = qj1,0, . . . , St+n−1 = qi,n−2}
= P{Bt+1 = oi |Bt = oj1},
if P{Bt+1 = oi, Bt = oj1 , . . . , Bt−k+1 = ojk} > 0. Hence {Bt; t ∈ Z} is a Markov process.
Now a discrete measure-preserving deterministic system (M,ΣM , µ, T ) is mixing iff for all
A,B ∈ ΣM
lim
t→∞
µ(T t(A) ∩B) = µ(A)µ(B). (7)
The deterministic representation of every irreducible and aperiodic n-step Markov process,
and hence (Ω,ΣΩ, µΩ, V,Ξ0), is mixing (Ornstein 1974, 45–47). This implies that {Bt; t ∈
Z} is irreducible and aperiodic.
Let ∆(k) =
∑l
i=1 oiχγi×[0,u(oi))(k), where u(oi), 1 ≤ i ≤ l, is defined as follows: u(oi) =
u(sr) where γi ⊆ βr. It follows immediately that {Xt = ∆(Rt); t ∈ R} is a semi-Markov
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process. Consider the surjective function Ψ : M → {o1, . . . , ol}, Ψ(m) = ∆(ψ(φ(m))) for
m ∈ Mˆ and o1 otherwise. Recall that (X,ΣX , µX ,Wt) is a factor (via φ) of (M,ΣM , µ, Tt)
and that (X,ΣX , µX ,Wt) is isomorphic (via ψ) to (K,ΣK , µK , Rt). Therefore, {Zt =
Ψ(Tt); t ∈ R} is a semi-Markov process with outcomes oi and times u(oi), 1 ≤ i ≤ l.
Now consider the surjective observation function Γ : {o1, . . . , ol} → S, where Γ(oi) = sr
for γi ⊆ βr, 1 ≤ i ≤ l. By construction, esmz., Γ(Ψ(Tt(m))) = Θ(Tt(m)) = Yt(m) for
all t ∈ R. Hence, because {Yt; t ∈ R} strongly (Φ, ε)-simulates (M,ΣM , µ, Tt), µ({m ∈
M |Γ(Ψ(m)) 6= Φ(m)}) < ε.
8.4 Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1 Let (M,ΣM , µ, Tt) be a measure-preserving deterministic system where
(M,dM) is separable and where ΣM contains all open sets of (M,dM). Assume that
(M,ΣM , µ, Tt) satisfies the assumption of Theorem 1 and has finite KS-entropy. Then
for every ε > 0 there is a stochastic process {Zt; t ∈ R} with outcome space MO = ∪hl=1ol,
h ∈ N, such that {Zt; t ∈ R} is ε-congruent to (M,ΣM , µ, Tt), and for all k ∈ R+ there
are oi, oj ∈MO such that 0 < P{Zt+k=oj |Zt=oi} < 1.
Proof : A partition α (cf. Definition 14) is generating for the discrete measure-preserving
system (M,ΣM , µ, T ) iff for every A ∈ ΣM there is an n ∈ N and a set C of unions of
elements in ∨nj=−nT j(α) such that µ((A \ C) ∪ (C \ A)) < ε (Petersen 1983, 244). α is
generating for the measure-preserving system (M,ΣM , µ, Tt) iff for all A ∈ ΣM there is
a τ ∈ R+ and a set C of unions of elements in ⋃all m⋂τt=−τ (T−t(α(T t(m)))) such that
µ((A \ C) ∪ (C \ A)) < ε (α(m) is the set αj ∈ α with m ∈ αj).
By assumption, there is a t0 ∈ R+ such that the discrete system (M,ΣM , µ, Tt0) is
ergodic (cf. Definition 13). For discrete ergodic systems Krieger’s (1970) theorem implies
that there is a partition α which is generating for (M,ΣM , µ, Tt0) and hence generating
for (M,ΣM , µ, Tt). Since (M,dM) is separable, for every ε > 0 there is a r ∈ N and
mi ∈ M , 1 ≤ i ≤ r, such that µ(M \ ∪ri=1B(mi, ε2)) < ε2 . Because α is generating for
(M,ΣM , µ, Tt0), for each B(mi,
ε
2
) there is an ni ∈ N and a Ci of union of elements in
∨nij=−niTjt0(α) such that µ((B(mi, ε2) \ Ci) ∪ (Ci \ B(mi, ε2))) < ε2r . Let n= max{ni}, β=
{β1, . . . , βl}= ∨nj=−nTjt0(α) and Ψ(m) =
∑l
i=1 oiχβi(m) with oi ∈ βi. Since Ψ is a finite-
valued, Theorem 1 implies that for the process {Ψ(Tt); t ∈ R} for all k ∈ R+ there are
oi, oj such that 0 < P{Zt+k=oj |Zt=oi} < 1. Because α is generating for (M,ΣM , µ, Tt),
β is generating too. This implies that (M,ΣM , µ, Tt) is isomorphic (via a function φ) to
the deterministic representation (M2,ΣM2 , µ2, T
2
t ,Φ0) of {Zt; t ∈ R} (Petersen 1983, 274).
And, by construction, dM(m,Φ0(φ(m))) < ε except for a set in M smaller than ε.
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